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THE APPEARANCE OF IMPROPRIETY: How THE ETHICS WARS
HAVE UNDERMINED AMERICAN GOVERNMENT, BUSINESS, AND
SocIETY. By Peter W. Morgan and Glenn H. Reynolds. New York:
The Free Press. 1997. Pp. xiii, 272. $25.
Rameshwar Sharma needed cash to continue his research on
two proteins, alpha2A and alpha2ac, so he turned to the federal gov
ernment.1 At the time he submitted his grant application, Sharma
had completed a good deal of work on alpha2A but very little on
alpha2ac· At some point while typing his forty-six page grant appli
cation, Sharma realized that repeatedly typing alpha2A and alpha2ac
was annoying. To ease his pain, he created macro keys that he
could hit whenever he wished to type either protein. Big mistake.
On page twenty-one he hit the wrong key, inserting alpha2ac where
alpha2A should have been.
No one on the National Institute of Health (NIH) review panel
was fooled - they all knew that if Sharma really had done the
work on alpha2ac that his typo seemed to indicate, he would have
trumpeted his progress. In addition, the surrounding discussion
concerned alpha2A·
Quite apart from the typo, the NIH panel denied Sharma's
grant application. Had this been all that had happened to Sharma,
he would have considered himself lucky. Instead, an anonymous
accuser forwarded his application to the Office of Science Integrity
(later the Office of Research Integrity (ORI)). After investigation,
the ORI determined that his typo constituted scientific misconduct.
The gist of the ORI's position was that Sharma was attempting to
fatten his chances by fabricating his work product.
Three years later an appeals panel vindicated Sharma, conclud
ing that his typo "was the result of a careless error" (p. 130). In the
interim, the federal investigation closed his lab, forcing him to take
an unsalaried position at an optometry college in Pennsylvania. He
lived in a dorm. He made so little money that he had to pull his two
children out of college and he was unable to attend his father's fu
neral in India. As Sharma himself put it, the entire ordeal had a
"devastating effect" on his reputation and his career (p. 129).
Some Orwellian nightmare? Orwellian maybe, nightmare no.
In the Appearance of Impropriety, Peter W. Morgan2 and Glenn H.
Reynolds3 present Rameshwar Sharma's splintered reputation and
career as what remain after one passes through the enormous buzz
1. This entire story appears in Morgan and Reynolds's book. See pp. 128·30.
2. Member, Dickstein, Shapiro, Morin, & Oshinsky LLP.
3. Professor of Law, University of Tennessee College of Law.
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saw created by the conjunction of the Ethics Establishment - the
bureaucracies that police behavior in several of the largest seg
ments of American society4 - and the appearance of impropriety
standard - the ethical standard those bureaucracies apply to indi
vidual behavior. Morgan and Reynolds argue that each component
alone has its problems, but that together they are devastating. The
potent combination has affected areas other than science, including
government, business, and academia. Although the authors are not
the first to decry the appearance of impropriety standard,5 they are
the first to analyze it in relation to the institutional context in which
it operates, noting how that context magnifies its imperfections.
Despite the book's ambitious sweep, perhaps it is not ambitious
enough. For example, Morgan and Reynolds fail to provide any
foundation for their discussion by defining what they mean by ethi
cal behavior.6 More specifically, Morgan and Reynolds fail to sup
ply any one ethical yardstick against which society should measure
its members' behavior. The authors flirt with several ethical con
structs - the Golden Rule (pp. 37, 109), what amounts to an
agency-cost definition (pp. 46, 74), and finally a motivational model
or a model that examines the actor's motives (p. 36)
but they
stop short of choosing one.7 To be fair, the authors did not set out
to answer the age-old conundrum of what constitutes ethical behav
ior. But because they fail to ground their discussion in some ex-

4. Morgan and Reynolds identify Ethics Establishments in several areas of contemporary
society. For example, in government, there is the independent counsel (pp. 75-80); in busi
ness, there is the enormous business ethics industry (p. 100); and in the natural sciences, there
is the Office of Research Integrity (p. 127).
5. See CHARLES W. WoLFRAM, MonERN LEGAL ETHICS § 7.1.4 (1986); Cynthia M.
Jacob, A Polemic Against R.P.C. 1.7(C)(2): The "Appearance of Impropriety" Rule, N.J.
LAW., June 1996, at 23; Alex Kozinski, Teetering on the High Wire, 68 U. COLO. L. REv. 1217,
1226-27 (1997). But see Ann McBride, Ethics in Congress: Agenda and Action, 58 GEO.
WASH. L. REv. 451, 466-67 (1990) (arguing in favor of the appearance of impropriety
standard).
6. For an example of an author struggling with this task in the appearance of impropriety
context, see Robert F. Bauer, Law and Ethics in Political Life: Considering the Cranston
Case, 9 J.L. & PoL. 461 (1993) (dissecting the concept of self interest - essentially Morgan
and Reynolds's agency-cost model below - in political ethics).
7. It may initially seem possible to shoehorn these three methods into one theory, and, in
fact, many philosophers have attempted to do so. See generally JoHN HARSANYI, Can the
Maximin Principle Serve as a Basis for Morality?, A CRITIQUE OF JoHN RAwL's THEORY in
ESSAYS ON ETHICS, SOCIAL BEHAVIOR, AND SCIENTIFIC EXPLANATION 37 (Gerald Eberlein
& Werner Leinfellner eds., 1976) (seeking to combine Rawls's "original position" with utili
tarianism); HENRY SIDGWICK, MEraons OF ETHICS (photo. reprint 1980) (1874) (attempting
to synthesize utilitarianism with other ethical methods). Most ethical philosophers, however,
now believe that the methods, when developed in detail, lead to very different theories that
can diverge sharply in some cases. See, e.g., J.J C. SMART & BERNARD WILLIAMS, UTILITARI
ANISM: FoR AND AGAINST 97-100 (1973) (giving examples of the clash between utilitarian
ism and Golden Rule-type ethics).
.
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plicit definition of ethical behavior, their analysis at times feels
superficial.8
In the end, the book's analysis inheres largely in its application
of the adage "You get what you pay for" to present-day ethical dis
course, in effect restating it to read "Ask for appearances, and ap
pearances are what you will receive." It adorns that analysis with
anecdotes ranging from the humorous to the outright scary.9 The
book's general argument can be somewhat facile at times10 and
might occasionally leave those desirous of more searching inquiry
8. For example, occasionally the authors seem to argue for an agency-cost model, see
infra note 14 and accompanying text, by suggesting that inducing ethical behavior is merely a
matter of aligning incentives. At one point they suggest that our legislators' incentives devi
ate from the collective good as a result of special-interest influence. P. 35. They further
suggest that we should "engage in a meaningful debate as to which sorts of private influences
are acceptable and which are not." Id. But even assuming that an agency-cost model is the
correct basis for divining an ethical construct, it does not follow that "a meaningful debate"
on special-interest influence is desirable or even possible. For in order to distinguish the
good special-interest influence from the bad, one needs to define the "public good" - a very
difficult task. What is the public good if not what emerges from a fight between special
interests? One might argue that even if in general a fight between special interests defines
the public good, the process is distorted by the money they infuse into the system. But is this
necessarily correct? If the special-interest groups raise their funds from individuals, maybe
the dollars they dump into the system are representative of public support. Then again,
maybe not. It is certainly possible that the current system is skewed toward the rich.
Whatever is in fact the case, the point here is that the authors fail to discuss any of this.
9. The story with which I began this Notice, for example, certainly qualifies as scary. On
the lighter side, Morgan and Reynolds recount William Safire's reaction to Senator Biden's
"borrowing" some language from British Labour Party Leader Neil Kinnock in one of his
speeches during the 1988 presidential race. Biden eventually had to withdraw from the race
as a result. That's not the amusing part. What was funny was Safire's account of political
plagiarism in general and his own small part in it. Speaking of Biden's speech, he said:
Maybe my familiarity with rhetorical borrowing has left me insensitive to the shock of
recognition. I remember listening to John F. Kennedy's inaugural, with its stirring line
"In your hands, my fellow citizens, more than mine, will rest the final success or failure
of our course." I had to admire the way Ted Sorensen evoked the rhythm of the line in
the Lincoln first inaugural: "In your hands, my dissatisfied fellow-countrymen, and not
in mine, is the momentous issue of civil war." (Kennedy subtly corrected Lincoln's re
dundancy of fellow-countrymen; that was especially astute.) What's wrong with such
evocation? Wmston Churchill, writing his ringing 1940 speech about defending his is
land by fighting on the beaches, in the streets, etc., recalled Georges Clemenceau's defi
ance in 1918: "I shall fight in front of Paris, within Paris, behind Paris." (Clemenceau, in
turn, was paraphrasing marshal Ferdinand Foch on Amiens.) That sort of boosting - a
less pejorative term than lifting and certainly far from plagiarizing, rooted in the Latin
for "kidnaping" - is done all the time.
Pp. 145-46 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting William Safire, No Heavy Lifting,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 27, 1987, § 6 (Magazine), at 12). Safire then told on himself. Evidently,
when working as a speech writer for Richard Nixon, Safire "boosted" a phrase from Kennedy
that he had taken from Adlai Stevenson that Stevenson had in tum lifted from Franklin D.
Roosevelt. Safire started to feel a little guilty about it, so he called the author of FDR's
speech to apologize. Instead of castigating Safire, the author confessed that he had in turn
"boosted" it from a speech by Robert Ingersoll, nominating James Blaine for President in
1876. So much for originality in politics.
10. For example, the authors suggest that one way to foster personal and governmental
responsibility is to shrink the federal government's responsibilities, both practically and con·
stitutionally. P. 194. While this may be true, given current debates, it does not appear to be a
solution easy, or arguably even possible, to implement.
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dissatisfied. Nevertheless, what the book lacks in academic rigor, it
makes up for in readability and intrinsic interest, and it leaves the
reader with a graphic understanding of the dangers of the combina
tion of the Ethics Establishment and the appearance of impropriety
standard.
Part I of this Notice discusses Morgan and Reynolds's views on
the appearance of impropriety standard. Part II engages in a simi
lar examination with respect to the Ethics Establishment. Part III
outlines the problems the authors identify as springing from the
combination of the two. Finally, Part IV discusses some of the solu
tions that Morgan and Reynolds propose.
I.

THE APPEARANCE OF IMPROPRIETY

STANDARD

A. Subverting the Standard
The appearance of impropriety standard is just what it sounds
like - an ethical standard that focuses on whether behavior ap
pears improper, not on whether it is. At the heart of Morgan and
Reynolds's arguments rests the plausible proposition that "a preoc
cupation with mere appearances inevitably leads to the conceal
ment of substantive abuses" (p. 15). The problem springs not from
an appearance standard per se but from the misuse that it invites (p.
8). In particular, the authors argue that an appearance standard is
vulnerable to two perversions - Petty Blifil (pronounced Bliff-full)
and Grand Blifil11 - both of which distract us from the underlying
substantive behavior.
Morgan and Reynolds use Petty Blifil to "describe the ease with
which unscrupulous individuals use our ethical standards to attack
relatively innocent individuals with accusations of 'impropriety"' (p.
21). According to the authors, one· of the most noteworthy exam
ples of Petty Blifil occurred during the Savings and Loan (S&L)
scandal. Federal Home Loan Bank Board Chairman Edwin J. Gray
opposed bank deregulation in direct contravention to the wishes of
several S&L operators, including Charles Keating. In an attempt to
drive Gray out, Keating systematically funneled information on
Gray's expense practices to the Wall Street Journal . and the
Washington Post. Despite the fact that Gray was following past
Bank Board practices, the press accused Gray of "being too close to
the savings and loans he was supposed to be regulating" (p. 22).
Sure enough, Gray left office, dragging his tattered reputation be
hind him. Keating, on the other hand, gave large gifts to Mother
11. Morgan and Reynolds borrow the term "Blifil" from a novel by Henry Fielding. See
HENRY FIELDING, THE HlsTORY OF ToM JoNES, A FOUNDLING 615 (Martin C. Battestin &
Fredson Bowers eds., Oxford Univ. Press 1975) (1749). Fielding wrote the book as an attack
on appearance ethics in England during his own time, the Augustan Age (1660-1750). Blifil,
who was adept at manipulating ethical appearances for his own benefit, was Fielding's villain.
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Teresa and waged an antipornography war, all of which won him
high acclaim. After the S&L edifice collapsed and the dust cleared,
however, Keating found himself in jail and the "questions about the
appearance of Gray's expenses [were] supplanted by questions
about exactly how many hundreds of billions of dollars the Ameri
can taxpayer lost in what has been called the 'worst public scandal
in American history. "'12
Because the appearance of impropriety standard opens the door
to this type of duplicity, the standard is counterproductive. Rather
than encouraging ethical behavior, it can drive those who are truly
interested in the public welfare - the Grays of the world - from
the process only to make room for those "who are so determined to
acquire power, or adoration, or whatever, that they will endure just
about anything to get it" (p. 24).

Grand Blifil represents the corruption of the appearance stan
dard on a grand scale. Grand Blifil consists of the manipulation of
appearances to create the illusion of institutional propriety (p. 27).
It results in two phenomena. First, requiring proper appearances
encourages proper appearances rather than proper substance (p.
28). Second, in an effort to supply the proper appearance, even the
best-intentioned may succumb to hiding unsightly facts (p. 29).
As to the first type of Grand Blifil, the authors point to cam
paign finance reform as one of the better examples (p. 30). In par
ticular, they recount the Illinois state legislature's attempts to
control its members' receipt of campaign funding. In response to
an episode in which riverboat-gambling lobbyists pulled state repre
sentatives off the House :floor to give them campaign contributions,
the legislature passed a law making it illegal to give contributions
on state property. The reason? It looked bad. The result? Lobby
ists could continue to contribute as before, just not on state prop
erty. The authors argue that this case illustrates Grand Blifil's
tendency to "treat[ ] symptoms instead of causes" (p. 35) and to
leave the underlying problems unchanged.

As an example of the second type, Morgan and Reynolds offer
seasoned government bureaucrats' desire to operate government
orally rather than in writing (p. 29). Why do they refuse to write
things down? It allows them to protect appearances by ensuring
that no "less-than-rosy assessments of how things are going" show
up later to splinter the illusion (p. 29). The problem with this prac
tice "is that we cannot fix what we cannot see" (p. 29).

In short, the authors argue, albeit indirectly, that the appearance
standard serves society poorly. Rather than triggering more search
ing inquiry, the authors contend that the appearance standard shifts

12. P. 23 (quoting MARTIN MAYER, THE GREATEST-EVER BANK ROBBERY: THE
COLLAPSE OF THE SAVINGS AND LoAN INDUSTRY 1 (1990)).
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our focus away from our underlying substantive problems as we
each expend our time and energy trying to appear ethical and at
tempting to show that others do not. Consequently, it leaves those
underlying problems unsolved. Finally, as in the case of Edwin
Gray, it has a tendency to drive the truly ethical from the process
,because it can provide such a powerful tool to the unscrupulous.
B.

So Why Do We Have It?

If the appearance standard is so counterproductive, why do we
use it? Morgan and Reynolds provide several explanations for our
love of form over substance (pp. 41-46). First, looking at form is
easier than looking at substance.13 Deciding whether some behav
ior truly comports with our ethical standards is very difficult. One
must know or learn about the intricacies of the arena in which the
behavior occurred - say, business - to analyze whether what hap
pened was in fact unethical. It is much easier to say: "Hmmm . . .
that looks bad" and be done with it.
Second, it is safer (p. 43). As argued above, determining
whether behavior is ethical is often complicated. One must analyze
the behavior for its substance rather than its appearance. That sub
stance provides others with a foundation from which to attack one's
determination. Appearances are like beauty, however - they are
in the eye of the beholder. I can say that behavior appears im
proper without fear of someone else substantively proving me
w'rong. After all, my determination is nothing more than a state
ment of how the behavior appears to me.
Third, the relative. nature of the standard rests well within the
comfort zone of many Americans (p. 43). Since World War II,
America's professional and managerial classes have expanded.
Much of the work these individuals do revolves around intangibles
- legal concepts, public relations campaigns, and the like. This
work makes them comfortable with the ephemeral appearance
standard. In addition, even those who are not professionals live in
today's entertainment-oriented world - one that focuses heavily
on appearance rather than substance. "It is hardly surprising that
appearance ethics thrives amid such a culture" (p. 44).
Fourth, it can befriend the truly unethical (p. 44). The appear
ance standard is double-edged. Not only does it permit an accuser
to magnify minor transgressions into major appearance problems,
13. P. 41. In saying that the appearance standard is easier, the authors do not mean to
suggest that it is any easier for people to agree on what appears improper. Rather, they
mean that it is easier for th_e critic to form an opinion; in other words, it takes less work and
expertise to decide whether behavior looks improper than"it does to determine whether be
havior is improper.
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but it also allows the unethical to reduce ethical offenses to mere
appearance problems.
Finally, it's comforting (p. 45). Appearance ethics "gives the il
lusion of control and precision" (p. 45). Substantive analysis is
more complex and therefore more uncertain. Whether one has
committed a true ethical infraction can be difficult to ascertain,
leaving the one doing the analyzing uneasy about her decision. The
analysis - if one may call it that - of whether something looks
bad seldom suffers from the same infirmity. In this sense, the fact
that the appearance of impropriety standard is easier to administer,
as argued above, makes it more comforting to those doing the
administering.
C.

Problems with the Analysis

While Morgan and Reynolds's account is powerful, it has its
shortcomings. First, the authors fail to provide a foundational defi
nition of ethical conduct. The absence of such a definition glosses
over one of the main reasons why we may have settled for an ap
pearance standard: necessity. We may need a simple, easy-to
understand, but somewhat superficial theory because we cannot
agree entirely on what behavior is unethical.
Two examples of the authors' own passing dalliance with various
standards illustrate the "necessity" explanation. At one stage in the
book, the authors indicate that they define ethical conduct as that
which comports with the Golden Rule (p. 109), while in another
they define it as that which is consistent with a utilitarian-like14
agency-cost model15 (p. 46). The Golden Rule standard is straight
forward: "Always treat others as you would like them to treat
you."16 The agency-cost model requires a bit more explanation. It
rests on the Millian view that ethical behavior is that which maxi
mizes overall social welfare. Under this view, the individual is en
trusted with the task of behaving in ways that maximize societal
welfare. In effect, each individual serves as society's agent. Conse
quently, when an individual behaves in a way designed to increase
personal welfare at the expense of societal welfare - creates an
agency cost - he acts unethically.
14. Utilitarianism is "the ethical theory, that the conduct which, under any given circum
stances, is objectively right, is that which will produce the greatest amount of happiness on
the whole." SmGWICK, supra note 7, at 411.
15. Agency costs result from a divergence in incentives between an agent and a principal.
In their simplest form, they result when a principal engages an agent to perform some task
for him, but the agent acts with his own interests in mind instead. From the principal's per
spective, the agent's failure to perform the task exactly as the principal would have wished
results in costs to the principal. See ROBERT S. PINDYCK & DANIEL L. RumNFELD,
MICROECONOMICS 608 (3d ed. 1995) (discussing the "principal-agent problem").
16. Matthew 7:12.
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These two standards are not necessarily coextensive. Consider
wealth redistribution. Tue Golden Rule perhaps supports redistri
bution: if I were poor, I would prefer for a wealthy individual to
share his wealth with me; therefore, if I am wealthy, I should share
my wealth with someone less fortunate. The agency-cost method,
on the other hand, may counsel against redistribution. If I value my
wealth more than a less fortunate individual, even though he may
value wealth as well, redistribution reduces overall social welfare
and is unethical.17

It is not at all clear that society has chosen one theory of ethical
conduct over the other.18 Without a unitary definition, there is no
shared substance on which Morgan and Reynolds can center the
reader's attention. Without that substance, we may be relegated to
concerning ourselves with whether something looks bad.
Second, Morgan and Reynolds's analysis fails to respond to
some of the reasons why society might desire an appearance stan
dard. One may think of the appearance standard as a prophylactic
rule.19 At least in the area of governmental ethics, such a rule
might prove useful for several reasons. As an initial matter, unethi
cal conduct is often hidden from view. As the President's Commis
sion on Federal Ethics Law Reform put it with reference to
honoraria:
17. Indeed, matters are still more complex than this discussion would suggest. Some de
fenders of views similar to the Golden Rule have sharply criticized redistribution. See
ROBERT NozicK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA (1974). Meanwhile, some advocates of
utilitarianism and its relatives have supported very extensive redistributive measures. See,
e.g., PETER UNGER, LIVING HIGH AND LETTING DIE (1996).
18. In fact, there exist several possible candidates; we have been able to settle on none of
them as the definitive formulation of ethical conduct. One possibility is Mill's utilitarianism.
See supra note 14. Another is Kant's theory, which considers motives as they relate to the
action an individual takes. His view asks, of that action, whether the rule that the action
embodies could be a universal law; if so, the action is morally right. See IMMANuEL KANT,
FOUNDATIONS OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS (Lewis White Beck trans., Robert Paul
Wolff ed., Bobbs-Merrill 1969) (1785). Frnally, John Rawls's theory of justice as fairness,
which employs the maximin criterion, is based on certain aspects of Kant's views. See JoHN
RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971); John Rawls, Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory,
in MoRAL DISCOURSE AND PRACTICE 247 (Stephen Darwall et al. eds., 1997). Indeed, given
this uncertainty, there exists great debate in the legal co=unity concerning the relationship
of the law and morality. Compare Frank I. Michelman, The Supreme Court -1968 Term
Foreword: On Protecting the Poor Through the Fourteenth Amendment, 83 HARv. L. REv. 7,
9, 14-19 (1969) (arguing for adoption of the Rawlsian approach in the Fourteenth Amend
ment context) with Robert H. Bork, The Impossibility of Finding Welfare Rights in the Con
stitution, 1979 WASH. U. L.Q. 695, 699-700 ("The violent disagreements among the legal
philosophers alone demonstrate that there is no single path down which philosophical rea
soning must lead. . . . Under these impossible circumstances, courts - perhaps philosophers,
also
will reason toward conclusions that,appeal to them for reasons other than those ex
pressed. . . . The consequence of this philosophical approach to constitutional law almost
certainly would be the destruction of the idea of law.").
19. See, e.g., George D. Brown, The Constitution as an Obstacle to Government Ethics Reformist Legislation After National Treasury Employees Union, 37 WM. & MARY L. REv.
979, 1006 (1996).
-
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Honoraria paid to officials can be a camouflage for efforts by individ
uals or entities to gain the officials' favor. The companies that pay
honoraria and related travel expenses frequently deem these pay
ments to be normal business expenses and likely believe that these
payments enhance their access to the public officials who receive
them.20
As Morgan and Reynolds themselves argue, the appearance of im
propriety is much easier to see than is the impropriety itself.

In addition, a prophylactic rule may dampen the temptation to
act unethically.21 The Supreme Court utilized this rationale in va
cating a government contract because of the apparent improprieties
of one of the contract's chief negotiators.22 In discussing whether
the negotiator's conduct violated 18 U.S.C. § 434,23 the Court
noted:
[T]he statute establishes an objective standard of conduct, and that
whenever a government agent fails to act in accordance with that
standard, he is guilty of violating the statute, regardless of whether
there is positive corruption. . . . To this extent, therefore, the statute is
more concerned with what might have happened in a given situation
than with what actually happened. It attempts to prevent honest gov
ernment agents from succumbing to temptation by making it illegal
for them to enter into relationships which are fraught with
temptation.24
Prophylactic rules recognize that the wrong circumstances can
tempt even the most well-intentioned individual to engage in uneth
ical behavior. Such standards respond to this reality by limiting the
opportunities for individuals to p ut themselves in those
circumstances.
Finally, and most important, some have argued that the appear
ance standard - and prophylactic rules like it - do no less than
ensure the sanctity of our democracy.25 As Professor Dennis
Thompson explained:

[I]n the more impersonal world of politics, reality and appearance
blend together so that we cannot often tell the difference. Not only
can most citizens judge politicians and political institutions only by
what they appear to do, but also for many citizens what they appear
to do is what they actually do. . . . Citizens have no way of finding out
what the reality is, and therefore every reason to assume the
20. PRESIDENT'S CoMMN. ON FED. ETHrcs LAw REFORM, To SERVE WITH HoNoR 35
(1989).
21. See, e.g., Brown, supra note 19, at 1006.
22. See United States v. Mississippi Valley Generating Co., 364 U.S. 520 (1961).
23. 18 U.S.C. § 434 (1948) (repealed 1962).
24. Mississippi Valley Generating Co., 364 U.S. at 549-50.
25. See Mississippi Valley Generating Co., 364 U.S. at 561-62; Brown, supra note 19, at
1006.
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worst. . . . There is an ethical obligation to protect the appearance of
propriety almost as great as to produce its reality.26
The Supreme Court has agreed. The Court cautioned that the ap
pearance of impropriety is "an evil which endangers the very fabric
of a democratic society, for a democracy is effective only if the peo
ple have faith in those who govern . . . . "27
IL

THE ETHICS

ESTABLISHMENT

In Chapters Four through Nine, Morgan and Reynolds chronicle
the explosion of the Ethics Establishment; these bureaucracies
operationalize the appearance standard and give it wide applica
tion. The authors trace the origins of the Ethics Establishment to
August 5, 1974
the day the Nixon White House released the
"smoking gun" audio tape.28 With the tape's release, Americans'
distaste for public institutions reached an all-time high. Within
months a concerted effort was underway to cleanse them of all un
ethical conduct (p. 47).
-

Given its origins, it is not surprising that the Ethics Establish
ment has most pervasively invaded our governmental institutions.
According to the authors, nowhere is this invasion more apparent
than with the Independent Counsel (p. 75). In response to Nixon's
"Saturday Night Massacre,"29 .Congress created the Independent
Counsel. The Counsel, largely free fro� political control, and en
joying an almost unlimited budget, is appointed by the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. This combination
of political unaccountability and fiscal freedom creates a prosecutor
without an off-switch. The Independent Counsel remains free to
dig for the most minor infractions - infractions of which almost
anyone would be guilty.

26. Congressional Ethics Rules: Hearings Before the House Bipartisan Task Force on
Ethics, lOlst Cong. 1 {1989) (statement of Professor Dennis F. Thompson, Harvard Univ.).
27. Mississippi Valley Generating Co., 364 U.S. at 562.
P. 47. Morgan and Reynolds track a steadily declining trend in Americans' confi
dence in their public institutions beginning in 1960. P. 49. They mark as the starting point of
this trend the U-2 spy plane incident over the Soviet Union. Eisenhower initially lied, claim
ing the U-2 was a weather plane - a story he later recanted. Nevertheless, they place the
birth of the Ethics Establishment with Nixon's release of the "smoking gun" tape - the tape
on which Nixon is heard directing one of his aides to push the CIA to pressure the FBI to
curtail its Watergate investigation.
28.

29. Tue "Saturday Night Massacre" occurred when President Nixon, in an attempt to
thwart any investigation of the Watergate break-in, fired Special Prosecutor Archibald Cox
and every member of his team. See G. Gordon Liddy, Character, Conscience, and Destiny, 96
MICH. L. REv. 1975, 1979 {1998) (reviewing KEN GORMLEY, ARCHIBALD Cox: CONSCIENCE
OF A NATION {1997)) {discussing the Massacre).
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The Ethics Establishment has also created its own "Iron Trian
gle,"30 consisting of government officials, interest groups, and the
press. As calls for additional ethics regulations mounted, the gov
ernment enlisted the help of its bureaucrats to create and operate
new agencies like the Office of Government Ethics and new posi
tions such as Designated Agency Ethics Officials (p. 81). Similarly,
congressional staffers can now support or oppose policies and po
tential appointees by manipulating alleged ethical violations (p. 96).
In addition, a network of interest groups, such as the Center for
Public Integrity, Common Cause, and Public Citizen, champion eth
ics in government (p. 90). Finally, after America lionized
Woodward and Bernstein, the press quickly learned that exposing
ethical improprieties paved the way to fame and fortune (pp. 9293). Together, these players constitute a self-perpetuating system:

The relationship between ethics bureaucrats . . . and the Congress and
interest groups is marked by constant interaction and trading of fa
vors. Congressional staffers get "dirt" from interest groups who, for
example, oppose the confirmation of a particular judge or the imple
mentation of a: particular policy. Then they leak the information to
journalists, and hold hearings that generate more news and that allow
interest groups an opportunity to testify and otherwise get their
message out. Journalists investigating the scandals get still more leaks
from government officials close to the scandal, often in exchange for
not linking those officials to what went Wl'.Ong - or even occasionally
in exchange for defending those officials in columns or on political
talk shows. [p. 96]
The end result is an Ethics Establishment that runs on a renewable
resource - political opportunism.
The Ethics Establishment did not limit itself to the governmen
tal arena. Rather, it laid down roots in myriad other sectors of soci
ety. Beginning with the insider trading scandals of the 1980s,
business spawned its own ethics cottage industry (p. 100). Gener
ally, the ethics-in-business movement manifested itself in company
ethics codes (p. 101). Currently, roughly ninety percent of
America's largest companies have ethics codes.31
Similarly, as Rameshwar Sharma's story suggests, the scientific
community has embroiled itself in its own Ethics Establishment (p.
127). The criminal justice system, on the other hand, has less cre
ated its own Ethics Establishment than been co-opted by it. As the
ethics movement has gained steam, we increasingly have criminal30. P. 96. The term "Iron Triangle" was first coined to explain the relationship between
the Pentagon, Congress, and defense contractors. See GORDON ADAMS, THE IRoN TRIAN·
GLE (COUNCIL ON ECONOMIC PRIORITIES) (1981).
31. P. 103 (citing Patrick E. Murphy, Corporate Ethics Statements: Current Status and
Future Prospects, 14 J. Bus. Ennes 727 (1995)).
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ized ethical infractions.32 Those who just recently would have been
subject only to social opprobrium now face jail time.33
Ill.

THE CONJUNCTION OF THE APPEARANCE OF IMPROPRIETY
STANDARD AND THE ETHICS ESTABLISHMENT

Morgan and Reynolds argue that .the combination of the Ethics
Establishment and the appearance standard results in predictably
problematic outcomes. The Ethics Establishment has injected into
large segments of American society the relentless search for ethical
misconduct. The appearance standard has focused that search on
the ephemeral and insubstantial. This combination has gutted
those segments in which it operates, kicking up appearance
firestorms while leaving the underlying substantive problems
largely untouched. Two examples make the authors' point.
First, as noted above, many of America's largest companies are
adopting ethics and corporate culture codes. While installing these
codes may lead to more ethical companies, the standard practice of
purchasing "off-the-shelf'' codes in order to create the appearance
of having improved the ethical culture may have the opposite effect
as these companies spend more precious time and resources on ap
pearing ethical than on being ethical (p. 104). Texaco, for example,
produced a booklet entitled Texaco's Vision and Values in which it
stated "Our employees are our most important resource" and
"Each person deserves to be treated with respect and dignity in ap
propriate work environments, without regard to race, religion, sex,
age, national origin, disability or position in the company" (p. 105).
Despite these public declarations, Texaco found itself mired in a
discrimination suit for the private statements its executives made
concerning African Americans and other minorities (p. 105). As
Morgan and Reynolds point out, "[i]t's not the code; it's the cul
ture" (p. 105). In other words, it is not the appearance, but the
substance.
Second, the Independent Counsel is particularly troublesome
when combined with the appearance standard. Unlike the normal
prosecutor who is summoned to prosecute a specific crime and who
must exercise prosecutorial discretion as a result of his budgetary
and temporal constraints, the Independent Counsel prosecutes an
32. Pp. 159-60 (citing John C. Coffee, Jr., From Tort to Crime: Some Reflections on the
Criminalization ofFiduciary Breaches and the Problematic Line Between Law and Ethics, 19
AM. Cim.1. L. REv. 117, 119-26 (1981)).
33. For a good example of the results of this trend to criminalize ethics, see David Grann,
Prosecutorial Indiscretion: Espy and the Criminalization of Politics, NEw REPUBLIC, Feb. 2,
1998, at 18 ("Espy could be facing more than 100 years in prison for the appearance of
impropriety, for simply taking gifts. . . . The irony is that, before [the independent prosecutor]
stepped in, the democratic system had exacted its own eloquent justice without the blunt
instrument of the independent counsel or the new ethics laws.").
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individual and has almost unlimited resources in trying to uncover
criminal conduct that until recently was simply unethical (p. 171).
Most important, the increasing criminalization of ethical standards
and use of the Independent Counsel appear to have confused the
American public, as individuals increasingly run ethical and legal
imperatives together (pp. 173-74). Instead of strengthening soci
ety's ethics, it has led to the widespread belief that whatever is legal
must be ethical (p. 174). As a result, one may successfully defend
oneself against allegations of impropriety with the claim that one's
behavior was not illegal, and our ethical standards erode as people
begin to equate ethical standards with arguably more lenient legal
standards (p. 174).
IV.

THE

SOLUTIONS

In the last chapter of The Appearance of Impropriety, Morgan
and Reynolds suggest seven rules for righting America's ethics ship.
The authors admit that their suggestions are no quick fix (p. 199);
indeed, they deride the quick-fix mentality as what brought us ap
pearance ethics in the first place (p. 199). Nevertheless, their pro
posals are somewhat simplistic. In the end, they amount to little
more than: "Quit using the appearance standard." While correct,
the advice fails to provide the reader with much more than broadbrush-stroke guidance.
First, Morgan and Reynolds argue that we should "accentuate
the negative" (p. 201). In short, "seek out and encourage the re
porting of bad news. Not scandal, or improper appearances, but
truly bad news about things that aren't working" (p. 201). This way,
those who must make decisions will know whether something needs
additional attention. Second, keep things "crunchy" (p. 202). Cre
ate systems where substantive performance is easy to monitor.
"[O]rganizational structures in which someone has to take responsi
bility for results, and in which results are obvious, produce better
behavior than those in which responsibility is diffused, and results
are difficult to measure" (p. 202).
Third, "keep your eye on the ball" (p. 203). Relegate the ap
pearance standard to those areas in which its application is benefi
cial. For example, apply it to groups consisting of specialized
individuals who should make nonpolitical decisions, like judges.34
Fourth, "responsibility is for everyone" (p. 205). A strong ethical
·

34. For an opinion that the appearance standard may impose costs in the judicial arena as
well, see Kozinski, supra note 5, at 1226-27 ("I think there is also a converse danger, and that
is having a judiciary too far removed from contemporary life, too shielded from the everyday
experiences and problems of the co=unity in which they live. Consistent with current no
tions that judges should avoid even the appearance of impropriety, many of my judicial col
leagues tend to cut themselves off from substantial contact with the world around them once
they ascend to the bench. While avoiding conflicts of interest is certainly a good thing, it is
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system should demand as much from accusers as it does from the
accused. Unlike the current system, which is soft on both sides, the
new system should focus a critical eye on the behavior at issue and
its motivations as well as the motivations of the accuser. In this
way, the authors argue, we may be able to avoid stories like
Rameshwar Sharma's.
Fifth, '�do [not] call virtuous people chumps" (p. 205). Cur
rently, American society seems to believe that it is better to be
tricky than virtuous. We constantly reinforce in one another the
idea that the way to get ahead is to focus on appearances. In the
end, we are left with only appearances. Instead, we should rein
force the belief that virtuous conduct is our touchstone.
Sixth, "if you focus on appearances, you will fail even at that"
(p. 206). As you concentrate on appearances to the detriment of
substance, the substance erodes, making it impossible to maintain
even the appearance of propriety.35 Finally, "cultivate virtues,
rather than appearances" (p. 207). "Cultivating virtue does not
simply mean trying to do the right thing. It means trying to be the
kind of.person who does the right thing" (p. 207). In effect, Morgan
and Reynolds argue that if we are successful in this, the need for
having ethical standards at all simply will fade away.
CONCLUSION

If the contemporary world of ethics is as Morgan and Reynolds
suggest, we all should be more diligent in watching our backsides
lest we run the risk bf ending up like Rameshwar Sharma. One
typo and one enemy could end a career. But while the authors per
form admirably in prompting visceral terror iri the reader by re
counting disturbing anecdote after disturbing anecdote, they are
less successful in satisfying the reader's intellectual demands. The
authors need to attempt to build their arguments on a coherent def
inition of ethical behavior. They need to address frontally some of
the more legitimate rationales for an appearance standard. Finally,
they should devote more time and effort to their proposed solu
tions. Altering institutional culture is a daunting task, one which
they afford too little attention and respect. In the end, the book's
shortcomings lie not in what it does, but in what it does not do.
Nevertheless, while Morgan and Reynolds may leave some doubt in
also important to encourage judges to continue living in the real world, rather than sequester
ing themselves in their chambers.").
35. For instance, during the Watergate investigations President Nixon spent large por
tions of his time devising plans to ensure that his administration appeared proper. Nixon
advised his chief of staff H.R. Haldeman to "stay close to the p.r." P. 61. Of course, Nixon
failed even at that and his reputation was destroyed as a result.
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the reader's mind about the dangers of the Ethics Establishment
and its sword the appearance standard, they leave no doubt in the
reader's heart.
- Jordan B. Hansell

